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Abstract 
In this paper, we have reviewed the Covid induced shock to the debt and deficit profiles of 10 of the largest 
economies by size of GDP in 2019 referred to in this paper as the Big-10 economies. There is a sharp 
upsurge in their government debt-GDP ratios because their policy responses to the Covid induced recession 
have been large fiscal stimuli based on borrowing. With low and often negative growth rates and high fiscal 
deficit, the debt-GDP ratios are projected to rise sharply in these economies. As normalcy is restored, these 
countries may attempt to sharply reduce their borrowing levels relative to GDP. However, we argue that 
before this is done, individual countries may do well to reassess their sustainability norms whether cast in 
terms of agreements such as the Maastricht Treaty or country level Fiscal Responsibility Legislations (FRLs) 
or other similar norms. This revision is called for because of the longer-term trends in these economies of 
rising money supply, falling nominal interest rates and nominal growth rate. The contribution of this article 
lies in highlighting that the existing FRL norms have become dated in the European and other similar 
economies because of significant changes in macro parameters such as the interest rate, the long-term growth 
rate and the government debt-GDP profiles of these countries as compared to the time when these norms 
were originally determined. There is thus a need now to redetermine these norms which may be higher than 
their current levels. Even though, some recent literature suggests that the sustainability benchmarks may 
have shifted upwards, we argue that the post Covid debt-GDP ratios have exceeded these revised 
benchmarks by significant margins in the case of a number of the Big-10 economies. 
Purpose: In this paper, we examine the Covid induced shock to the debt and deficit profiles of 10 of the 
largest economies in the world. By projecting the increase in government debt-GDP ratios for selected 
countries we evaluate the resultant debt-GDP ratios in the context of their fiscal responsibility commitments. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: Change in the government debt-GDP ratio in a country has need 
decomposed into three factors namely, (1) increased fiscal deficit, (2) real growth rate and (3) inflation rate 
Findings: Existing FRL norms have become dated in the European and other similar economies due to 
significant changes in their macro parameters such as the interest rate, the long-term growth rate and the 
government debt-GDP profiles as compared to the time when these norms were originally determined.  
Practical Implications: Governments in these countries may now need to redetermine the fiscal 
responsibility norms which may be higher than their current levels.     
Originality/Value: This paper attempts to address the following research gaps in the existing literature on 
sustainability of government debt (a) in spite of major changes in the long term trends concerning growth 
and interest rates, the validity of existing FRL norms have not been reassessed, (b) highlight that many of the 
Big-10 economies do not have suitable fiscal responsibility legislations, (c) assessment of the extent to which 
the post Covid government debt-GDP levels would exceed current or revised sustainability norms. 
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In order to keep their government debt-GDP ratios at sustainable levels, many countries have undertaken Fiscal 
Responsibility Legislations (FRLs) specifying debt-GDP targets consistent with sustainability conditions. An 
overview of evolution of government debt-GDP ratio indicates that it experiences a one-time upsurge as a 
result of an economic crisis and tends to remain at the higher level. Policy efforts to bring it down have not 
been effective particularly because of asymmetry in managing countercyclical fiscal deficit. Fiscal deficit may 
be increased in crisis years as part of stimulus initiatives in economic downswings, but it is often difficult to 
bring it adequately down in economic upswings. The impact of Covid-19 on government debt-GDP ratio for 
most countries is likely to be quite large. It would take considerable reduction in fiscal deficits of future years 
if the government debt-GDP ratio is to be brought down back to sustainable levels. If governments chose to 
let their debt-GDP ratios remain at unsustainably high levels, their capacity to deal with future economic crises 
would be significantly impaired. In this paper, we project the increase in government debt-GDP ratios for 
selected countries and evaluate the resultant debt-GDP ratios in the context of their fiscal responsibility 
commitments. We then specify fiscal deficit adjustment paths that would be needed in order to bring the debt-
GDP ratios back to sustainable levels. For this purpose, we have selected the following 10 countries: the US 
(USA), People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan (JPN), Germany (DEU), India (IND), the UK (GBR), France 
(FRA), Italy (ITA), Brazil (BRA) and Canada (CAN). This group comprises 3 EU economies and 7 non-EU 
economies. Together, these constitute the largest economies of the world, accounting for a share of 67.5% 
(2019) in global GDP (at market exchange rates). We refer to these as the Big-10 group of countries in the rest 
of the paper.  
From the viewpoint of sustainability of government debt relative to GDP in the major global economies, there 
is a significant research gap pertaining to the following aspects: (a) in spite of major changes in the long term 
trends concerning growth and interest rates, the validity of existing FRL norms have not been reassessed in 
the literature; (b) many of the Big-10 economies do not have suitable fiscal responsibility legislations; and (c) 
there is no assessment of the extent to which the post Covid government debt-GDP levels would exceed current 
or revised sustainability norms and the implications of the impact of Covid on global government indebtedness. 
In partially addressing this research gap, we have argued that the existing FRL norms have become dated in 
the European and other similar economies because of significant changes in macro parameters such as the 
interest rate, the long-term growth rate and the government debt-GDP profiles of these countries as compared 
to the time when these norms were originally determined. There is thus a need now to redetermine these norms 
which may be higher than their current levels. Even though, some recent literature suggests that the 
sustainability benchmarks may have shifted upwards, we argue that the post Covid debt-GDP ratios have 
exceeded these revised benchmarks by significant margins in the case of a number of the Big-10 economies. 
Evolution of government debt: 1996 to 2019 
In this section, we look at the comparative position of countries with respect to the evolution of their 
government debt to GDP ratio. This analysis is in terms of debt-GDP ratios where both debt and GDP are in 
local currency units (LCU). Data for this analysis has been drawn from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)1. For the period 1996 to 2019, except Canada, the government debt-GDP ratio increased for all selected 
countries (Table 1). Notably sharp increases were observed for Japan (136.9% points), followed by Brazil 
(46.3% points), the UK (41.5% points), and the US (40.4% points). The increase in the government-debt GDP 
ratio was mild for Germany (1.7% points) and India (6.4% points). 
In 1996, three countries, namely Italy, Japan and Canada already had a government debt to GDP ratio which 
was higher than 100%. Other countries like the UK, Brazil, Germany, France, India and the US had a 
government debt-GDP ratio in the range of 43.2% to 68.2%. People’s Republic of China’s government debt-
GDP ratio2 at 21.4% was the lowest amongst the selected set of countries. As economies went through different 
phases of economic crisis and responded to these through fiscal stimulus based on an increase in their fiscal 
 
1 Global debt database, IMF; https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/GDD 
2 A large part of public sector borrowing in People’s Republic of China is undertaken through non-financial state-owned 
enterprises which is not included in the government debt as given by the IMF. In 2018, the debt-GDP ratio of People’s 






deficits, their government debt to GDP ratio kept increasing. The average government debt to GDP ratio for 
the Big-10 group of countries was 68.1% in 1996. 
Table 1: Government debt-GDP ratio of selected major economies: 1996 to 2019 
Countries 1996 2005 2010 2013 2019 2019-1996 (% points) 
BRA 43.2 68.6 63.0 60.2 89.5 46.3 
CAN 100.2 70.6 81.2 86.1 88.6 -11.6 
PRC 21.4 26.3 33.9 37.0 52.6 31.2 
DEU 57.8 67.3 82.4 78.7 59.5 1.7 
FRA 60.0 67.4 85.3 93.4 98.1 38.1 
GBR 43.8 39.6 74.6 84.2 85.4 41.5 
IND 66.0 80.9 66.0 67.4 72.3 6.4 
ITA 119.1 106.6 119.2 132.5 134.8 15.7 
JPN 101.0 176.6 207.7 232.2 238.0 136.9 
USA 68.2 65.5 95.5 104.9 108.7 40.4 
Average 68.1 76.9 90.9 97.7 102.7 34.7 
Source (basic data): IMF 
Brazil (BRA), Canada (CAN), People's Republic of China (PRC), Germany (DEU), France (FRA), United Kingdom (GBR), India 
(IND), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), United States (USA). 
By 2005, while the government debt-GDP ratio remained above 100% for Japan and Italy, there was a sharp 
decline of 29.6% points in this ratio for Canada. In India’s case, the government debt relative to GDP increased 
from 66% in 1996 to 80.9% in 2005. People’s Republic of China’s government debt-GDP ratio increased only 
marginally by 4.9% points in 2005. 
By 2010, the government debt-GDP ratio surged to 207.7% for Japan and 119.2% for Italy. For the US, there 
was a massive jump from 65.5% in 2005 to 95.5% in 2010, an increase of 30% points. Some of the other 
western economies like France, Canada, the UK and Germany also experienced an increase in their government 
debt to GDP ratios. These countries had borne the brunt of the 2008 crisis. India, however experienced an 
improvement in its government debt-GDP ratio which fell from 80.9% in 2005 to 66% in 2010, a fall of nearly 
15% points. This showed the effect of adherence to the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act 
(FRBMA) which was adopted by both the central and state governments during 2003 to 2010.  
By 2013, except for Brazil and Germany, there was an increase in the government debt-GDP ratio of all 
countries. There were sharp increases in the case of Japan, Italy, the UK and the US and relatively milder 
increases in the case of India, People’s Republic of China and Canada. The government debt-GDP ratio for 
the US crossed 100%, reaching a level of 104.9%. 
By 2019, government debt to GDP ratio had continued to surge in the case of Japan and Italy, reaching a level 
of 238.0% and 134.8% respectively. There was a sharp increase of 29.3% points and 15.6% points in the 
government debt-GDP ratio of Brazil and People’s Republic of China. As discussed earlier, the period from 
2014 to 2019 was characterized by crises in both these economies. 
A. Composition of debt: share of government debt in total debt  
In this section, we undertake a review of the composition of total debt as divided between government debt 
and private debt for individual countries.  
Table 2 shows that in the Big-10 group of countries, in 1996, the share of government debt in total debt was 
the highest for India at 71.6%, followed by Italy at 63.8% and Canada at 40.8%. At the lower end, the lowest 
share of government debt in total debt was for People’s Republic of China at 20.5%, followed by the UK at 
27.5%. The average share of government debt in total debt for the selected set of countries was 40.6% in 1996.  
By 2005, seven out of ten selected countries experienced a decline in their share of government debt in total 
debt as compared to that in 1996. However, in the case of Japan, Brazil, and Germany, this share increased by 
19.5% points, 10.5% points and 1.7% points respectively in 2005. The average share of government debt in 
total debt for the selected countries fell to 39.6% in 2005. 
Table 2: Share of government debt in total debt of selected major economies: 1996 to 2019 
Countries 1996 2005 2010 2013 2019 2019-1996 (% points) 






Countries 1996 2005 2010 2013 2019 2019-1996 (% points) 
CAN 40.8 32.2 31.3 31.2 29.2 -11.6 
PRC 20.5 19.5 19.7 19.3 21.4 1.0 
DEU 33.3 35.0 41.7 41.6 34.2 0.9 
FRA 31.6 31.1 33.1 34.0 31.4 -0.2 
GBR 27.5 19.4 27.9 31.9 34.2 6.8 
IND 71.6 65.3 54.2 53.1 56.7 -14.9 
ITA 63.8 52.0 48.8 51.6 55.1 -8.6 
JPN 32.2 51.7 55.9 59.1 59.3 27.1 
USA 36.1 30.3 36.4 41.1 42.0 5.9 
Average 40.6 39.6 40.1 41.0 41.8 1.2 
Memo: Total debt to GDP ratio 
Average 174.3 196.9 227.6 235.7 248.1 73.8 
Source (basic data): IMF 
By 2010, the effect of the 2008 global economic and financial crisis had become visible. The share of 
government debt in total debt increased in the US, the UK, Japan, Germany, France and People’s Republic of 
China. However, in Brazil, Italy and Canada, this share fell indicating that the 2008 crisis had led to an even 
greater increase in private debt. In India also, the share of government debt in total debt fell because of a fall 
in government debt-GDP ratio and an increase in private debt-GDP ratio. 
In 2013, the average share of government debt in total debt increased marginally by 0.9% points to 41%, with 
five countries showing a decline in this ratio and the remaining five showing an increase. Among selected 
countries, the sharpest increase of 4.7% points was shown by the US and the sharpest decline of 5.3% points 
was shown by Brazil.   
The composition of debt in 2019 shows that the relative share of government debt increased for seven out of 
10 countries as compared to their 2013 levels. Countries which experienced a decline in their share of 
government debt in 2019 include Germany, France and Canada. 
Thus, over the period from 1996 to 2005, there was an increase in the overall debt-GDP ratio of countries in 
general, but this increase was relatively more for private sector debt whereas the share of government debt in 
total debt had shown some decline. Between 2005 and 2019, the overall debt-GDP ratio continued to surge, 
but in this period, the share of government debt in total debt increased on average. 
Projecting Covid’s impact on government debt-GDP ratio: 2020 and 2021 
In this section, we consider decomposing the change in the government debt-GDP ratio in a country into three 
factors namely, (1) increased borrowing (fiscal deficit), (2) real growth rate and (3) inflation rate. Change in 
government debt amounts to a country’s fiscal deficit which is one of the main instruments through which a 
stimulus is injected in order to overcome an economic crisis.  
Change in the government debt-GDP ratio in any year t may be defined as: 𝒃𝒕 − 𝒃𝒕−𝟏 = 𝒇𝒕 − 𝒃𝒕−𝟏 [ 𝒈𝒕𝒏(𝟏 + 𝒈𝒕𝒏)]                    (𝟏) 
Here, 𝒃𝒕 and 𝒃𝒕−𝟏 denote the debt-GDP ratio in the year t and t-1 respectively. 𝒇𝒕 is the fiscal deficit to GDP 
ratio in year t which is defined as change in the level of debt relative to the level of nominal GDP, that is, 𝒇𝒕 = 𝑩𝒕−𝑩𝒕−𝟏𝒀𝒕  . 𝑔𝑡𝑛 refers to the nominal growth rate which can be expanded as the sum of real growth rate and the inflation 
rate, that is, 𝒈𝒕𝒏 = 𝒈𝒕 + 𝝅𝒕 + 𝒈𝒕𝝅𝒕   







𝒃𝒕 − 𝒃𝒕−𝟏 = 𝒇𝒕 − 𝒃𝒕−𝟏. (𝒈𝒕 + 𝝅𝒕). (𝟏 + 𝒈𝒕 + 𝝅𝒕)−𝟏                          (𝟑) 𝒃𝒕 = 𝒇𝒕 + 𝒃𝒕−𝟏. [𝟏 − 𝒈𝒕 − 𝝅𝒕 + 𝒈𝒕𝟐 + 𝝅𝒕𝟐 + 𝟐. 𝒈𝒕. 𝝅𝒕]                         (𝟒) 
Utilizing equation (4), we project the government debt-GDP levels for 2020 and 2021, using independent 
projections of fiscal deficit to GDP ratio, real GDP growth and inflation rate in these years. Real GDP growth 
and inflation forecasts are taken from the October 2020 issue of IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO). The 
fiscal deficit to GDP ratio has been derived by using government debt to GDP ratio and the nominal GDP for 
these two years as projected by the IMF in its WEO (October 2020). The relevant values of these three 
determinants over the period from 1997 to 2021 are given in Tables 3 and Annexure 2. 
Table 4: Estimated fiscal deficit relative to GDP: 1997 to 2021 
Year BRA CAN PRC DEU FRA IND ITA JPN GBR USA 
1997 6.6 0.2 1.3 2.2 3.3 8.3 2.7 7.2 1.5 1.6 
1998 14.2 1.4 1.4 2.2 2.6 9.0 2.1 10.0 -0.4 0.3 
1999 14.7 1.9 2.4 1.9 1.3 9.3 2.7 11.3 0.2 0.1 
2000 4.4 -0.6 3.2 0.3 1.6 8.6 1.8 8.5 -0.7 -2.3 
2001 10.3 3.7 3.8 0.6 1.7 10.7 5.1 8.0 -1.4 1.6 
2002 16.9 1.5 3.6 2.4 3.7 9.7 1.2 8.0 1.6 4.1 
2003 5.5 0.2 3.9 4.0 5.7 10.3 2.5 5.7 3.1 5.6 
2004 5.3 0.6 3.6 3.1 4.3 9.5 3.8 10.6 4.6 11.1 
2005 5.4 3.1 3.6 3.1 3.8 7.8 4.4 6.1 3.3 3.5 
2006 4.1 2.8 3.1 2.1 0.2 7.5 4.2 0.6 3.0 2.4 
2007 5.8 0.5 8.4 0.3 3.0 7.6 1.3 0.6 3.0 3.3 
2008 6.2 4.3 2.4 2.7 5.9 7.2 3.7 4.3 8.9 10.2 
2009 7.3 7.7 9.7 4.8 12.3 7.9 6.4 5.9 12.6 11.7 
2010 6.9 6.5 4.5 12.8 4.7 6.9 5.1 11.2 13.4 11.9 
2011 5.2 5.5 5.1 1.4 5.2 9.5 3.2 10.4 8.1 7.7 
2012 6.6 6.0 4.1 2.8 4.0 7.7 5.0 8.4 5.6 7.5 
2013 4.0 4.1 5.9 -0.5 4.0 7.5 5.1 7.3 4.2 5.1 
2014 6.8 3.5 5.8 0.1 2.9 6.1 4.1 8.4 5.6 4.1 
2015 12.5 5.4 4.2 -1.0 2.8 8.3 2.2 3.3 3.2 4.2 
2016 8.9 2.1 5.8 -0.5 3.9 7.2 2.7 6.9 3.3 4.8 
2017 9.1 3.8 6.5 -1.5 3.1 7.6 2.5 2.6 2.6 3.5 
2018 7.1 2.6 6.8 -1.5 2.4 7.0 2.9 2.5 2.4 6.6 
2019 6.8 2.0 7.7 -0.4 2.7 7.5 1.6 4.3 2.4 5.9 
Average 
(1997 to 2019) 
7.9 3.0 4.6 1.8 3.7 8.2 3.3 6.6 3.9 5.0 
2020 9.5 20.0 10.6 11.2 12.1 12.1 12.8 15.8 16.1 19.2 
2021 7.3 8.7 10.5 3.2 6.9 10.1 5.9 4.6 9.5 9.1 
Source (basic data): IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2020 
Table 4 shows the sharp increase in the government debt-GDP ratio in the pandemic affected year of 2020 
over 2019. The largest increase is for Japan at 28.2% points, followed by Italy at 27.0% points, Canada at 
26.0% points, the UK at 22.7% points and the USA at 22.5% points. The average increase in the government 
debt-GDP ratio for selected countries in 2020 is estimated at 19.9% points, twice as compared to an increase 
of 9.7% points following the 2008 global economic and financial crisis.  
In a recent paper Ramos-Herrera, and Prats (2020) have estimated the sustainable debt-GDP ratio for the 
European economies at 93% (table 4 of the paper). This is based on a Panel-ARDL estimation approach and a 
Dynamic Panel-Threshold model3. In the threshold model a common threshold of 93% was estimated. Table 
3 shows that in 2021 except for Germany the European economies as well as Brazil, Japan and USA are well 
above this threshold. India is very close to it while China is well below it.  
 






Table 3: Projected government debt relative to GDP: 2020 and 2021 
Country 2019 2020 2021 2020 minus 2019 2021 minus 2020 
BRA 89.5 101.4 102.8 11.9 1.4 
CAN 88.6 114.6 115.0 26.0 0.3 
PRC 52.6 61.7 66.5 9.1 4.8 
DEU 59.5 73.3 72.2 13.8 -1.1 
FRA 98.1 118.7 118.6 20.6 -0.2 
GBR 85.4 108.0 111.5 22.7 3.5 
IND 72.3 89.3 89.9 17.0 0.5 
ITA 134.8 161.8 158.3 27.0 -3.5 
JPN 238.0 266.2 264.0 28.2 -2.2 
USA 108.7 131.2 133.6 22.5 2.5 
Average 102.7 122.6 123.2 19.9 0.6 
Source (basic data): IMF, OECD 
Prospects of deficit and debt: implications for Fiscal Responsibility Legislations (FRLs) 
A. Departures from country-wise deficit and debt norms under FRLs/ benchmarks  
Most countries under study have FRLs specifying debt or fiscal deficit limits. These may be under statutory 
arrangements or other kinds of agreements to ensure sustainability of deficit and debt. For some countries, 
where such numbers are not available, we will utilize a notional benchmark for debt-GDP ratio as equal to 
60% in line with those relevant for the EU countries under the Maastricht Treaty norms. Table 5 summarizes 
the salient features of FRLs for individual countries under study. It is clear that in the post-Covid situation, 




Table 5: Salient features of Fiscal responsibility legislations: selected countries 
# Country Statutory basis for FRL Salient features 
1 Germany 
Fiscal deficit and debt targets 
are determined by the 
Maastricht criteria 
• General government fiscal deficit targeted 
at 3% of GDP 
• Public debt targeted at 60% of GDP 
• Supplemented by the Stability and Growth 
Pact - country-specific medium-term budgetary 
objectives (MTOs) were set; the fiscal compact 
establishes a structural deficit floor for the MTO 
of 0.5% of GDP for countries with debt above 
60% of GDP and of 1% of GDP for countries with 
debt significantly below 60% of GDP4. 
• The extent of annual adjustment for 
achieving the MTO depends on the economy’s 
cyclical position, debt level and the risks to public 
finance sustainability.  
• Governance reform (Six Pack) in 2011 
imposed stricter financial penalties on countries 





4 For details on EU fiscal rules see https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2019-09-10-assessment-of-eu-fiscal-






# Country Statutory basis for FRL Salient features 
4 India 
Fiscal Responsibility and 
Budget Management Act - 2003 
(last amended in 2018) 
• General government debt targeted at 60% of 
GDP and Union government debt targeted at 40% 
of GDP 
• Debt targets are to be achieved by fiscal 
year ending March 2025-26 
• Fiscal deficit at 3% of GDP as operational 
target - to be achieved by fiscal year ending 
March 2021 





Charter of Budget 
Responsibility (CBR) – 2016 
autumn update 
• To reduce the cyclically adjusted public 
sector net borrowing to below 2% of GDP by 
2020-21 
• Supplementary debt target and a welfare 
spending cap was specified:  
o public sector net debt as a percentage of 
GDP to be falling in 2020-21 
o expenditure on welfare in 2021-22 is 
contained within a predetermined cap and 
margin 
Fiscal rules as per Budget 2020 
• The current budget is to be brought in 
balance by the third year of the rolling five-year 
forecast period 
• The public sector net investment (PSNI) 
should not exceed 3% of GDP on average over the 
rolling five-year forecast period 
• If the debt interest to revenue ratio is 
forecast to remain over 6% for a sustained period, 
the government would take action to ensure a 
decline in government debt-to-GDP ratio 
6 US 
No FRL - Congress sets 
spending and revenue targets in 
the annual budget resolution 
• The last debt ceiling was introduced on 2 
March 2019 at US$21.9 trillion (102.6% of the 
2019 US nominal GDP)  
• This public debt limit was suspended in 
August 2019 until 31 July 2021 (Bipartisan 




Fiscal Management Strategy of 
2010 
• Stable reduction in the public debt to GDP 
ratio for both national and local governments shall 
be maintained from FY2021 onwards 
• Corresponding targets for fiscal balance 
include 
o Primary deficit to GDP ratio to be halved 
from its level in FY2010 by FY2015 at the 
latest, and a surplus to be achieved by FY2020 
at the latest 
o In and after FY2021, efforts for fiscal 
consolidation to be continued taking into 
account, the progress in achieving the debt 
target 
Basic Policy on Economic and 
Fiscal Management and Reform 
(2018) 
• Postponed the achievement of a primary 
surplus by general government (central and local), 






# Country Statutory basis for FRL Salient features 
• Continue to target a steady reduction in 
government debt-to-GDP ratio 
8 Brazil 
Fiscal Responsibility Law (May 
2000) 
• Senate sets debt limits for all levels of 
government.  
• There was never an agreement reached on 
the limit for the central government  
• Numerical multiyear targets are specified 
for the budget balance (for the current year and 
indicative targets for the next two years), 
expenditure and debt 
• Constitution mandates a "golden rule" 
principle (new borrowing should be at most equal 
to public investment) 
• Expenditure limits – 
o For federal government personnel 
expenditure limit set at 50% of net current 
revenue 
o For states and municipalities these are set 
at 60% of net current revenue 
9 Canada 
No FRL – political commitment 
to reduce debt5 
• No explicit deficit and debt targets 
• Consistent decline in the debt-GDP ratio 





No FRL … 
Source (basic data): IMF, authors’ compilation 
B. Departures from benchmark norm of 60% with respect to end-2021 government debt-
GDP ratios 
Table 6 captures the excess of the projected end 2021 government debt-GDP ratio over the benchmark norm 
of 60%. The largest deviation is that for Japan at 204.0% points followed by Italy at 98.3% points and the US 
at 73.6% points. The lowest departure is seen in the case of People’s Republic of China at 6.5% points followed 
by Germany at 12.2% points and India at 29.9% points.  
Table 6: Deviation of projected government debt-GDP ratio from benchmark norm  
# Country Projected debt-GDP ratio at 
end-2021 (%) 
Excess of end-2021 debt-GDP 
ratio over benchmark norm of 
60% (% point) 
1 BRA 102.8 42.8 
2 CAN 115.0 55.0 
3 PRC 66.5 6.5 
4 DEU 72.2 12.2 
5 FRA 118.6 58.6 
6 IND 89.9 29.9 
7 ITA 158.3 98.3 
8 JPN 264.0 204.0 
9 GBR 111.5 51.5 
 








10 USA 133.6 73.6 
 Source (basic data): IMF 
Restoring sustainability: macro trends and simulations 
In this section, we consider policy options available to different countries in order to reach sustainability levels 
from the projected debt-GDP ratios at the end of 2021. In this context, we consider two simulations. For this 
purpose, we will utilize alternative paths for the three determinants of the government debt-GDP ratio over the 
forecast period which extends from 2022 to 2050. These three determinants are (1) fiscal deficit-GDP ratio, 
(2) real GDP growth rate, and (3) GDP deflator-based inflation rate.  
Simulation 1: In this case, fiscal deficit to GDP ratio, real growth rate and inflation are all kept equal to the 
average level during the period 2012 to 2019. These conditions indicate the situation of individual countries 
prior to the Covid crisis but after the 2008 global economic and financial crisis had subsided. The simulation 
is carried forward up to 2050. The resultant debt-GDP ratio at the end of 2050 is given in Table 8. It is shown 
that no country other than Germany is able to reach a benchmark level of 60% which is consistent with the 
Maastricht Treaty norms even after a period of 30 years. In some cases, the departures are quite massive such 
as Japan (240.4% points), Italy (139.9% points), France (76.7% points), and the US (73.9% points). This 
indicates that without significant policy changes, much lower fiscal deficits than what has been maintained 
during 2012 to 2019 would be called for in order to move towards sustainability. In the case of Germany, a 
less than 60% debt-GDP ratio is reached because there were only two instances of a fiscal deficit during this 
period and on average, there was a fiscal surplus of 0.3% points of GDP. In fact, if Germany were to incur 
fiscal deficit as per the Maastricht Treaty norms, its debt position will also become unsustainable. This is 
shown in Simulation 2. 
Simulation 2 has been carried out with the average levels of growth and inflation rates over 2012 to 2019 but 
the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio has been modified in line with FRL norms or comparable norms in the case 
where the relevant legislations are not available. Thus, for the European countries, in our study namely, France, 
Germany, and Italy, it has been kept at 3% of GDP. For other developed countries also, where corresponding 
norms are not available, we have kept it at 3% of GDP. These countries are Canada, Japan, the UK and the 
US. For the three emerging market economies namely, Brazil, People’s Republic of China and India, we have 
kept it at 6% of GDP which is consistent with India’s FRBM. People’s Republic of China and Brazil do not 
have corresponding norms, but a fiscal deficit to GDP ratio of 6% is close to their average levels over the 
period 2011 to 20196. The resultant debt-GDP ratio at the end of 2050 for Simulation 2 is summarized in Table 
8. It is shown that in this case also, no country is able to reach the benchmark debt-GDP ratio of 60%. In 
India’s case, it comes close to 60% but still exceeds it. 
Table 7: Average fiscal deficit-GDP ratio, real GDP growth and deflator-based inflation (%) 
Country 
1997 to 2019 2012-2019 
Fiscal deficit 















BRA 7.9 2.3 7.4 7.7 0.3 6.3 
CAN 3.0 2.4 1.9 3.7 1.9 1.4 
PRC 4.6 8.9 3.0 5.9 7.1 2.2 
DEU 1.8 1.4 1.2 -0.3 1.4 1.7 
FRA 3.7 1.6 1.3 3.2 1.2 0.9 
IND 8.2 6.9 5.1 7.3 6.6 4.3 
ITA 3.3 0.6 1.8 3.3 0.0 1.0 
JPN 6.6 0.8 -0.5 5.5 1.1 0.4 
GBR 3.9 2.1 1.9 3.7 1.9 1.8 
USA 5.0 2.4 1.9 5.2 2.4 1.7 
Source (basic data): IMF 
 
 
6 The average fiscal deficit-GDP ratio during 2011-2019 for People’s Republic of China was 5.8%. For Brazil, this 






Table 8: Departure of projected debt-GDP ratio by end-2050 from the norm of 60% under simulations 
1 and 2 
Country 
Debt level at end 2050 Departure from Norm (60%) 
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 1 Simulation 2 
BRA 122.4 98.7 62.4 38.7 
CAN 115.1 102.2 55.1 42.2 
PRC 69.3 70.9 9.3 10.9 
DEU 23.3 88.2 -36.7 28.2 
FRA 136.7 131.7 76.7 71.7 
GBR 106.9 94.5 46.9 34.5 
IND 76.4 63.3 16.4 3.3 
ITA 199.9 193.2 139.9 133.2 
JPN 300.4 242.2 240.4 182.2 
USA 133.9 94.9 73.9 34.9 
Source (basic data): IMF 
These two simulations indicate that the FRLs in their present form would leave major global economies with 
much higher debt-GDP ratios than what can be considered consistent with sustainable levels. This is true of 
the Maastricht Treaty norms as well as India’s FRBM. In other countries where explicit FRLs do not exist, 
there is a clear need to consider a policy framework to bring the respective debt-GDP ratios to sustainable 
levels in the post-Covid world.  
In fact, it can be shown that the Maastricht Treaty norms of combining 3% of fiscal deficit-GDP ratio with 
60% of debt-GDP ratio had already become outdated even prior to the onset of Covid. With the disturbance 
caused by Covid, there is hardly any chance for any of these economies to remain consistent with the 
Maastricht Treaty norms. What will now be required is a modification of the Maastricht Treaty norm itself. 
The reason is that the real growth rate and the GDP deflator-based inflation rate in historical experience for 
many of the important European economies have become inconsistent with the implied nominal GDP growth 
rate of the Maastricht Treaty norms. For examining this, we consider the following framework: 
A sustainable combination of debt-GDP ratio (𝑏∗) and fiscal deficit to GDP ratio (𝑓∗) implies a certain 
nominal growth rate (𝑔𝑛) which is given by the following relationship: 𝑏∗𝑓∗ = (1 + 𝑔𝑛)𝑔𝑛                                   (5) 
Using 𝑏∗ = 60% and 𝑓∗ = 3%, this equation can be solved for deriving the value of 𝑔𝑛 = 5.26%. 
With European countries having moved into low real GDP growth and low inflation regimes, most countries 
show a nominal growth rate which is less than the threshold of 5.26%. This is shown in Table 9. In fact, based 
on the level of historically achieved growth rates, we can divide our sample group of countries into two groups: 
(a) developed countries, and (b) emerging market economies. The latter group includes Brazil, People’s 
Republic of China and India. 
Table 9: Real GDP growth, inflation and estimated nominal GDP growth (2012 to 2019)  
Real GDP growth GDP deflator-based 
inflation 
Nominal growth rate 
(derived) 
Group 1 
CAN 1.93 1.37 3.33 
DEU 1.40 1.72 3.14 
FRA 1.21 0.86 2.08 
ITA 0.00 1.03 1.03 
JPN 1.09 0.42 1.51 
GBR 1.90 1.75 3.68 
USA 2.36 1.70 4.10 
Average 1.41 1.26 2.70 
Group 2 
BRA 0.30 6.26 6.57 
PRC 7.07 2.21 9.43 







Real GDP growth GDP deflator-based 
inflation 
Nominal growth rate 
(derived) 
Average 4.66 4.25 9.06 
Source (basic data): IMF 
Clearly, the developed countries have moved into a growth and inflation regime which is much different from 
earlier years. The average nominal growth rate for the countries included in the sample here is only 2.7% 
during 2012 to 2019. This calls for a reconsideration of the Maastricht Treaty norms and recalibration of 
country-wise sustainable fiscal deficit and debt combinations. With respect to the European countries, if the 
benchmark nominal growth rate is kept at 3%, and the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio is also kept at 3%, we can 
derive the sustainable level of debt-GDP ratio using equation (5) as below: 𝑏∗ =  𝑓∗ (1 + 𝑔𝑛𝑔𝑛 ) = 103% 
Thus, the European countries should consider debt sustainability as an issue if they are unable to reach even 
this higher threshold. Here sustainability implies that for a given nominal growth rate, if a fiscal deficit relative 
to GDP at a given level is repeated year after year, the debt-GDP ratio will remain stable at the level of 𝑏∗. 
Considering the more general case of developed countries in our sample, we may provide a higher threshold 
for fiscal deficit to GDP ratio at 4%, noting that the average fiscal deficit to GDP ratio for the group of 
developed countries excluding Germany during 2012 to 2019 was 4.1%. In this case, 𝑏∗ = 137.3%. Thus, 
countries that are able to show somewhat higher nominal growth rate may fix their debt-GDP ratio at a higher 
level. 
 
Figure 1: Alternative combinations of 𝒃∗ and 𝒇∗ for different values of 𝒈𝒏. 
 
Source: Authors’ presentation 
In the case of emerging market economies however, the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio is higher on average and 
their nominal growth rate is also higher. This leads to somewhat different results. For the group of three 
emerging market economies in our sample, the average fiscal deficit to GDP ratio during 2012 to 2019 is 7%, 
and the average nominal growth is 9.1%. Using 7% for fiscal deficit to GDP ratio, and 9% for nominal growth, 𝑏∗ = 84.8%. Thus, these countries should consider uplifting their target debt-GDP ratios from their present 
levels although keeping it below the target for the group of developed countries.  
Figure 1 shows alternative paths of combinations of 𝑏∗ and 𝑓∗ for different values of 𝑔𝑛. These are straight 
lines passing through the origin. If  𝑏∗ is represented on the Y-axis and 𝑓∗ is represented on the X-axis, the 








































𝑑𝑏∗𝑑𝑓∗ =  (1 + 𝑔𝑛)𝑔𝑛                                     (6)  
For any given positive value of the nominal growth rate, the RHS will be a constant and higher than 1. As 𝑔𝑛 
is increased, the straight line would shift closer towards the X-axis. 
The current Maastricht Treaty benchmark is depicted by the points of intersection of the horizontal line at the 
debt-GDP ratio of 60% and the vertical line drawn from a fiscal deficit to GDP ratio of 3%. It is shown that if 
the nominal GDP growth rate in terms of its long-term value has become lower at 3% (real growth of 1% and 
inflation rate of 2%) as compared to its level for sustainability at 5.2%, then the sustainable combination of 
fiscal deficit and debt relative to GDP would be given by 3% and 100% respectively. In other words, if many 
of the developed economies have moved to lower growth and lower inflation trajectories, it would be 
appropriate to revise the relevant norms under the Maastricht Treaty, or comparable FRLs.  
The higher debt-GDP ratio would also be justified by recognizing that the long-term nominal interest rates 
have also moved down in many of the developed countries including the European economies. This is shown 
by Figure 2. It shows the downward movement of long-term nominal annual interest rates for the Euro area 
and selected individual European economies. For the Euro area, in the early 1990s, the nominal interest rate 
was averaging close to 10%. It has now fallen to close to 0.6%. 
Figure 2: Long-term interest rates: annual 
  
Source (basic data): OECD 
This long-term trend may be affected by a number of factors, but a primary determinant is the steadily 
expanding money supply in the Euro area. In Figure 3, this is represented by a seasonally adjusted index of 
broad money, which has increased from a level of 30.6 in 1992 to 114 by 2018 (Index value was 100 in 2015). 











































Source (basic data): OECD 
Note: M3 is measured as a seasonally adjusted index based on 2015=100. 
 
Review of recent literature on debt sustainability 
Recent literature on debt sustainability may be broadly divided into two parts. One group of papers focusses 
on econometric methodologies for assessing debt sustainability with or without some country applications. 
The second group consists of individual country/country group studies where debt sustainability legislations 
and empirical trends have been studied.  
An important early study by Tapsoba (2012) highlighted the importance of fiscal rules in affecting the fiscal 
policy behaviour of the governments. This paper analyses the effect of National Numerical Fiscal Rules (FRs) 
upon fiscal discipline in 74 developing countries over the period 1990–2007. The study assesses the impact of 
FRs on budgetary outcomes while controlling for the self-selection problem by using a variety of propensity 
scores matching methods. The authors find that the effect of FRs on structural fiscal balance is significantly 
positive, robust to a variety of alternative specifications, and varies with the type of FRs. They also find that 
the treatment effect differs according to countries' characteristics such as number of FRs, time length since 
FRs adoption, presence of supranational FRs, government fractionalisation and government stability. This 
paper suggests that the introduction of rule-based fiscal policy frameworks is a credible remedy for 
governments in developing countries against fiscal indiscipline. Further, simple adoption of FRs is not 
sufficient to guarantee fiscal credibility and fiscal discipline. Their adoption must be accompanied with a set 
of other measures such as fiscal transparency, fiscal responsibility, enforcement mechanisms, sanctions and 
independent fiscal institutions (fiscal councils). 
Jacobs et. al. (2019) have estimated a causal relationship between public debt ratios and economic growth rates 
for 31 EU and OECD countries for the period from 1995 to 2013. The authors estimate a panel VAR model 
that incorporates the long-term real interest rate on government bonds as a vehicle to transmit shocks in both 
the public debt to GDP ratio and the economic growth rate. It is found that there is no causal link from public 
debt to growth, irrespective of the levels of the public debt ratio. Rather, there is a causal relationship from 
growth to public debt. In high-debt countries, the direct negative impact of growth on public debt is enhanced 
by an increase in the long-term real interest rate, which in turn decreases interest-sensitive demand and leads 
to a further increase in the public debt ratio. 
There are only a few studies relating to debt sustainability in the case of Japan. One such study by Hansen et. 
al. (2016) emphasizes that Japan’s net debt to output ratio at nearly 150% is a significant fiscal burden. In 
addition, an aging Japanese society implies that public expenditures and transfers payments relative to output 
are projected to continue to rise until at least 2050. In this paper, the authors use a standard growth model to 
measure the size of this burden in the form of additional taxes required to finance these projected expenditures 
and to stabilize government debt. The fiscal adjustment needed is large in the range of 30-40% of total 
consumption expenditures. It is established that using a distorting tax such as the consumption tax or the labour 
income tax requires either tax to rise to unprecedented highs. This highlights the importance of considering 
alternatives that attenuate the projected increases in public spending and/or enlarge the tax base. 
Continuing with the case of Japan, Sakuragawa et. al. (2020) have considered the issue of fiscal sustainability 
in Japan. The authors investigated whether a simulation conducted under the political constraint imposed by a 
fiscal reaction function supports the official projection and debt sustainability. The methodology involves two 
steps. First, Japan’s fiscal reaction function is obtained by estimating the response of the primary surpluses to 
the past debt for a panel data set of 23 OECD countries. Second, political feasibility of the official projection 
is investigated using the estimated reaction function. The authors find that when the official criterion is used 
for the debt-to-GDP ratio, the government can attain the policy target of non-negative fiscal surpluses and 
realize fiscal sustainability. Notably, the negative growth-adjusted bond yield and the high growth rate 
contribute to this finding. The projected growth rate, growth-adjusted bond yield, and the possible fiscal fatigue 
in the reaction function influence the findings. It is established that the moderately high growth rate (the 
baseline scenario) is not enough to support the target of non-negative primary surpluses or to sustain debt. 
Debt sustainability requires the government to make further efforts to decrease the fiscal deficit at the level of 
debt over 220%. 
Aldama and Creel (2019) examined the long-term sustainability of public debt in the US under two broad 






on constant-parameter fiscal rules for the period covering 1940 to 2016, indicated that the government debt 
was unsustainable in the US. The key reason for such an outcome was attributed to the instability of 
government's behaviour over time. Their sustainability estimates using Markov-switching fiscal rule identified 
the presence of two regimes.  Under regime 1, the response of primary surplus to lagged public debt was found 
to be non-significant but positive while under regime 2, there was a strong positive response of primary surplus 
to lagged public debt indicating fiscal consolidation efforts by the government. However, the sustainable 
regime appeared less persistent with an expected duration of only 5.7 years as compared to 12.5 years under 
the unsustainable regime. Their results concluded that the government debt in the US is sustainable in the long 
run despite persistent unsustainable fiscal regimes.  
Cossia (2017) analysed the evolution of public debt across European countries, before and after the monetary 
unification, that is, from 1995 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2014. Using a simple linear regression estimation, the 
study compared the dynamics of public debt and of general government deficit of selected European countries 
individually as well as aggregated into two broad groups namely, (a) countries that are part of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) and (b) countries outside the EMU. It found a high degree of asymmetry in the 
evolution of public debt across countries within as well as outside EMU. The study concluded that the 
asymmetric paths of public debt and of government deficits may have been an important contributor to the 
rising uncertainties surrounding the growth prospects of the European economies.    
In a recent paper Ramos-Herrera, and Prats (2020) have estimated the sustainable debt-GDP ratio for the 
European economies at 93%. This is based on a Panel-ARDL estimation approach and a Dynamic Panel-
Threshold model7. In the threshold model a common threshold of 93% was estimated. 
Dirk and Paetz (2021) argue that the Covid-19 pandemic has revealed the shortcomings of the Euro area, which 
were already evident after the global financial crisis of 2008-09. The suspension of the stability and growth 
pact (SGP) and recent measures of the European Central Bank (ECB) have given some flexibility to the 
national governments and the central bank to bring about reforms. The three major reform proposals 
recommended by the authors are: (1) increased investment by the national governments in the ecological 
reconstruction of their industrial base, (2) reform of the SGP and the Maastricht Treaty, and (3) making 
government bonds generally risk-free in the Euro area. In the context of reforming the SGP and the Maastricht 
Treaty, they recommend that the debt-to-GDP ratios could be increased if the ECB secures the solvency of the 
Euro Area member states. Further, it is observed that deficits are not controlled by national governments and 
the existing rules bear the risk of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy. 
Reconsidering policy options  
Four major theoretical positions have informed policy makers in regard to macro-stabilizing policy initiatives 
and issues of debt sustainability. These are (i) Ricardian equivalence (ii) Neo-Classical school, (iii) Keynesian 
paradigm in its conventional or modern forms and (iv) the ‘tax and spend’ school. Barro, Robert (1989), 
Bernheim, B. D. (1989), Von Furstenberg, et.al. (1986), and Eisner, R. (1989) provide an analytical review of 
the assumptions and the relative merits of these schools of thought. Rangarajan. C and Srivastava, D. K. (2005) 
have examined this issue in terms of the theories involved and also provided an application in India’s context. 
Views of economists has remained divided so far. But in practical terms faced with major economic crises, most 
policy makers become Keynesian in their approach. As shown in our earlier analysis, this becomes quite clear 
by the noticeable one-time jumps in the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio in crises years.  
Empirically, policy makers look at the issue of sustainability of debt by reference to the likely long-term path 
of primary surpluses. One method of looking at the primary surplus is to make reference to the stream of interest 
payments.  The higher is the interest payment to GDP ratio, the higher is the primary surplus or the lower is the 
primary deficit relative to GDP given the same level of fiscal deficit. If the long- term trends indicate that the 
nominal interest rate has fallen over time, then for the same level of debt and fiscal deficit, interest payment to 
GDP ratio would have fallen and primary deficit relative to GDP would have increased. Thus, the sustainability 
consideration can be linked to the likely contours of interest payment to GDP ratio. The sustainability conditions 
giving combination of fiscal deficit and debt relative to GDP can be defined in an equivalent manner by making 
reference to either primary deficit/surplus to GDP ratio or interest payment to GDP ratio (see Rangarajan, C., 
& Srivastava, D. K. (2004) for a discussion on this). 
 






One implication of combining a lower interest rate with a higher debt relative to GDP is that the interest burden 
on the government as measured by total interest payment on government debt (𝐼𝑃𝑡) relative to GDP may be 
kept at a given level. The ratio, 
𝐼𝑃𝑡𝑌𝑡  is determined by the product of the average nominal interest rate (𝑖) and 
the debt-GDP ratio (𝑏𝑡). Thus, 𝑖𝑝𝑡 = 𝑖 ∗ 𝑏𝑡 can be defined by a rectangular hyperbola where debt-GDP ratio 
is on the Y-axis and the nominal interest rate is depicted on the X-axis (Figure 4). These curves as shown in 
chart 4 depict the same level of interest payment relative to GDP. They shift upwards for higher values of 𝑖𝑝𝑡. 
When the debt-GDP targets are moved up, for example, from 60% to 100%, the 𝑖𝑝𝑡 burden can remain the 
same by moving along the curve from A to B. At point B, the interest rate would have fallen to 1% but this 
can be combined with a debt-GDP ratio of 100%.  
Figure 4: Alternative combinations of 𝒃∗ and 𝒊 for different values of 𝒊𝒑𝒕 
 
Source (basic data): Authors’ presentation 
 
In conclusion, it may be said that the impact of Covid-19 has resulted in a major upsurge in the debt-GDP 
ratios of most countries. Their post-Covid debt-GDP ratios have departed significantly away from the relevant 
sustainability norms such as the Maastricht Treaty norms, India’s FRL, and similar benchmarks for other Big-
10 countries. However, before making an effort to bring down the debt-GDP ratios to the defined benchmark 
levels, it would be appropriate to examine whether the sustainable levels of debt-GDP ratios should be revised 
above the current norms. The reason for this is that long-term movements for major economies indicate a 
lowering of real growth rate, inflation rate, and nominal interest rate. Different countries may reassess their 
positions in this regard.  
Summary 
In this paper, we have reviewed the Covid induced shock to the debt and deficit profiles of the Big-10 
economies. There is a clear upsurge in their government debt-GDP ratios because policy responses of these 
countries to the Covid induced recession has been large fiscal stimulus based on borrowing. With low growth 
and high fiscal deficit, the debt-GDP ratios are projected to rise sharply in these economies in 2020 and 2021. 
As normalcy is restored, these countries may attempt to sharply reduce their borrowing levels relative to GDP. 
However, we argue that before this is done, individual countries may do well to reassess their sustainability 
norms whether cast in terms of agreements such as the Maastricht Treaty or country level FRLs or other similar 
guidelines. This revision is called for because of the longer-term trends in these economies of rising money 



















































Appendix 1: Fiscal Responsibility Legislations and debt limits 
The status of FRLs of the Big-10 countries (except People’s Republic of China) may be summarised as follows: 
1. In the European Union countries namely, Germany, Italy and France, the fiscal deficit and debt targets are 
determined by the Maastricht criteria. The Maastricht criteria include a limit of 3% of GDP for the general 
government fiscal deficit and 60% of GDP for public debt. These criteria were supplemented by the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) agreement in 2005. In the SGP, country-specific medium-term budgetary 
objectives (MTOs) were set for the individual EU members. The fiscal compact establishes a structural 
deficit floor for the MTO of 0.5% of GDP for countries with debt above 60% of GDP and of 1% of GDP 
for countries with debt significantly below 60% of GDP. The extent of annual adjustment for achieving 
the MTO depends on the economy’s cyclical position, debt level and the risks to public finance 
sustainability. As per the 2011 governance reform (Six Pack), lack of action to correct a significant 
deviation from the MTO can lead to the imposition of financial penalties. 
2. India’s Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act 20038 underwent a third amendment in March 
2018, since its inception. As per the 2018 amendment, the general government and Union Government 
debt-GDP ratios have been targeted at 60% and 40% of GDP respectively to be achieved by fiscal year 
ending March 2025-26.  The former fiscal deficit target of 3% of GDP for the union government has now 
become an operational target which is to be achieved by fiscal year ending March 2021. The Union 
Government has been mandated to prescribe the annual targets for reduction of fiscal deficit for the period 
beginning from the date of commencement of the act and ending on 31 March 2021. The revenue deficit 
target has been given up.  
3. In the UK, the ‘Charter of Budget Responsibility (CBR)’9 sets out the framework for managing the public 
finances, the policy and operation of debt management. The ‘Charter’ also sets out the government’s 
targets and the related rules. As per autumn 2016 update of the CBR 10 , the UK Treasury’s objective for 
fiscal policy was to ‘return the public finances to balance at the earliest possible date in the next 
Parliament’. In order to meet this objective, the treasury was mandated to target ‘to reduce the cyclically-
adjusted public sector net borrowing to below 2% of GDP by 2020-21’. Further, this mandate was 
supplemented by a debt target, that is, ‘a target for public sector net debt as a percentage of GDP to be 
falling in 2020-21’ and a welfare spending cap. The 2020 budget11 proposes to adhere to the fiscal rules:  
i. The current budget is to be brought in balance by the third year of the rolling five-year forecast 
period  
ii. The public sector net investment (PSNI) should not exceed 3% of GDP on average over the rolling 
five-year forecast period  
iii. If the debt interest to revenue ratio is forecast to remain over 6% for a sustained period, the 
government would take action to ensure a decline in government debt-to-GDP ratio. 
 
4. In the USA, there is no constitutional provision to guide fiscal decision-making. The US Constitution 
allows the Congress to make spending, taxing, and borrowing decisions. Further, the Congress sets 
spending and revenue targets in the annual budget resolution. Consequently, a debt ceiling has been set 
and changed extensively. Since 1960, Congress has modified the U.S. debt limit 78 times12. The last debt 
ceiling was introduced on 2 March 2019 at US$21.9 trillion, that is, 102.6% of the 2019 US nominal 
 
8 After the enactment of the FRBM Act in 2003 and the related FRBM Rules in 2004, the target fiscal deficit to GDP 
ratio of 3% for the Union Government was achieved only once, in the year 2007-08, when it was 2.5% of GDP. Since 
then, that target has not been achieved again. The FRBM Act was amended in 2012 and again in 2015. The revisions in 
2015 shifted the date for achieving the 3% (fiscal deficit to GDP) target for the Union Government to 2017-18. By this 
year, the amended revenue deficit target was put at 2% of GDP. 
9 The Charter has been changed on several occasions since its introduction in 2011. The latest version was proposed 
alongside Autumn Statement 2016 and came into force on Tuesday 24 January 2017 when the House of 
Commons approved it. 
10 http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/download/charter-budget-responsibility/ 
11https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/871799/Budget_202







GDP (IMF). Eventually, this public debt limit was suspended in August 2019 until 31 July 2021 
(Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019)13. 
5. In Japan, as per the Fiscal Management Strategy of 201014, a stable reduction in the public debt to GDP 
ratio for both national and local governments shall be maintained from FY2021 onwards. The 
corresponding fiscal balance targets have been defined as follows: 
i. For the national and local governments, the primary deficit to GDP ratio shall be halved from its 
level in FY2010 by FY2015 at the latest, and a surplus shall be achieved by FY2020 at the latest. 
ii. In and after FY2021, efforts for fiscal consolidation shall be continued taking into account, the 
progress in achieving the debt target. 
Recently, the 2018 Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform15 postponed the 
achievement of a primary surplus by general government (central and local), by five years, to FY2025 from 
FY2020. The reform however continues to target to steadily reduce the government debt-to-GDP ratio. 
6. In Brazil, a Fiscal Responsibility Law was enacted for all tiers of the government in May 2000. This law 
mandates a number of fiscal targets: 
i. The Senate sets debt limits for all levels of government. However, there was never an agreement 
reached on the limit for the central government. Thus, the only limits currently in place are for States 
and Municipalities. There are also limits set by the Senate for annual borrowing for States and 
Municipalities. The government sets numerical multiyear targets for the budget balance (for the 
current year and indicative targets for the next two years), expenditure and debt. In case of non-
compliance, corrective measures need to be taken and can result in sanctions. Escape clauses exist 
for exceptional economic conditions and natural disaster but can only be invoked with Congressional 
approval. There is also the "golden rule" principle set in the Constitution (new borrowing should be 
at most equal to public investment). 
ii. Personnel expenditure is limited to 50% of net current revenue for the federal government, and 60% 
for states and municipalities. Within each level of government, the law further specifies limits for the 
executive, legislative, judiciary and other offices, where applicable, 
iii. permanent spending mandates cannot be created without permanent revenue increases or spending 
cuts 
7. In Canada, in 1998, the debt repayment plan set out a “balanced budget or better” policy which, 
however, was not legislated at the federal level. A Contingency Reserve and an economic prudence 
factor were built into the federal budget and could be devoted to debt reduction. In 2006, the government 
abandoned the "balanced budget or better" rule with targets of C$3 billion debt reduction, coupled with 
eliminating net general government debt by 2021 and federal debt by 2013-14 (later changed to 2011-
12). Currently, at the federal level, Canada does not have explicit deficit and debt targets. However, a 











Appendix 2: Real GDP growth and deflator-based inflation rates 
Table A1: Real GDP growth: 1997 to 2021 
Year BRA CAN PRC DEU FRA IND ITA JPN GBR USA 
1997 3.4 4.3 9.2 1.8 2.3 4.0 1.8 1.1 3.9 4.4 
1998 0.3 3.9 7.8 2.0 3.6 6.2 1.8 -1.1 3.6 4.5 
1999 0.5 5.2 7.7 1.9 3.4 8.5 1.6 -0.3 3.4 4.8 
2000 4.4 5.2 8.5 2.9 3.9 4.0 3.8 2.8 3.4 4.1 
2001 1.4 1.8 8.4 1.7 2.0 4.9 2.0 0.4 3.0 1.0 
2002 3.1 3.0 9.1 -0.2 1.1 3.9 0.3 0.1 2.3 1.7 
2003 1.1 1.8 10.0 -0.7 0.8 7.9 0.1 1.5 3.3 2.9 
2004 5.8 3.1 10.2 1.2 2.8 7.8 1.4 2.2 2.4 3.8 
2005 3.2 3.2 11.4 0.7 1.7 9.3 0.8 1.7 3.2 3.5 
2006 4.0 2.6 12.7 3.8 2.4 9.3 1.8 1.4 2.8 2.9 
2007 6.1 2.1 14.3 3.0 2.4 9.8 1.5 1.7 2.4 1.9 
2008 5.1 1.0 9.7 1.0 0.3 3.9 -1.0 -1.1 -0.3 -0.1 
2009 -0.1 -2.9 9.4 -5.7 -2.9 8.5 -5.3 -5.4 -4.2 -2.5 
2010 7.5 3.1 10.6 4.2 1.9 10.3 1.7 4.2 1.9 2.6 
2011 4.0 3.1 9.5 3.9 2.2 6.6 0.7 -0.1 1.5 1.6 
2012 1.9 1.8 7.9 0.4 0.3 5.5 -3.0 1.5 1.5 2.2 
2013 3.0 2.3 7.8 0.4 0.6 6.4 -1.8 2.0 2.1 1.8 
2014 0.5 2.9 7.3 2.2 1.0 7.4 0.0 0.4 2.6 2.5 
2015 -3.5 0.7 6.9 1.5 1.1 8.0 0.8 1.2 2.4 3.1 
2016 -3.3 1.0 6.8 2.2 1.1 8.3 1.3 0.5 1.9 1.7 
2017 1.3 3.2 6.9 2.6 2.3 7.0 1.7 2.2 1.9 2.3 
2018 1.3 2.0 6.7 1.3 1.8 6.1 0.8 0.3 1.3 3.0 
2019 1.1 1.7 6.1 0.6 1.5 4.2 0.3 0.7 1.5 2.2 
Average 
(1997 to 2019) 
2.3 2.4 8.9 1.4 1.6 6.9 0.6 0.8 2.1 2.4 
2020 -5.8 -7.1 1.9 -6.0 -9.8 -10.3 -10.6 -5.3 -9.8 -4.3 
2021 2.8 5.2 8.2 4.2 6.0 8.8 5.2 2.3 5.9 3.1 
Source (basic data): IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2020 
Table A2: GDP deflator-based inflation: 1997 to 2021 
Year BRA CAN PRC DEU FRA IND ITA JPN GBR USA 
1997 7.7 1.1 1.7 0.3 0.9 6.5 2.6 0.5 1.1 1.7 
1998 4.9 -0.2 -1.0 0.7 1.0 8.0 2.4 0.0 1.0 1.1 
1999 8.0 1.9 -1.3 0.3 0.2 3.4 1.5 -1.3 0.9 1.4 
2000 5.6 4.3 2.1 -0.5 1.6 3.5 1.8 -1.4 1.9 2.2 
2001 8.2 1.7 2.1 1.3 2.0 3.1 3.0 -1.1 1.0 2.2 
2002 9.8 1.2 0.7 1.4 2.1 3.6 3.3 -1.5 2.1 1.6 
2003 14.1 3.3 2.7 1.3 1.9 3.8 3.1 -1.6 2.3 1.9 
2004 7.8 3.3 6.8 1.1 1.6 5.8 2.7 -1.1 2.5 2.7 
2005 7.4 3.1 4.4 0.4 1.9 4.2 2.0 -1.0 2.5 3.1 
2006 6.8 2.6 3.8 0.4 2.2 6.4 2.1 -0.9 2.8 3.0 
2007 6.4 3.3 7.8 1.8 2.6 5.8 2.5 -0.7 2.6 2.7 
2008 8.8 4.0 7.2 0.9 2.4 8.7 2.4 -1.0 2.9 1.9 
2009 7.3 -2.3 -0.1 1.8 0.1 6.1 1.7 -0.6 1.7 0.8 
2010 8.4 2.8 6.3 0.6 1.1 9.0 0.4 -1.9 1.5 1.2 
2011 8.3 3.2 8.2 1.1 0.9 5.2 1.6 -1.7 2.0 2.1 
2012 7.9 1.2 3.2 1.5 1.2 7.9 1.5 -0.8 1.7 1.9 
2013 7.5 1.7 2.6 2.0 0.8 6.2 1.1 -0.3 1.9 1.8 






2015 7.6 -0.9 0.1 1.9 1.1 2.3 0.9 2.1 0.6 1.0 
2016 8.1 0.8 0.9 1.3 0.5 3.2 1.1 0.3 2.1 1.0 
2017 3.6 2.5 3.9 1.4 0.5 3.8 0.7 -0.2 1.9 1.9 
2018 3.3 1.8 3.5 1.7 1.0 4.6 0.9 -0.1 2.1 2.4 
2019 4.2 1.9 2.4 2.2 1.2 2.9 0.9 0.6 1.9 1.8 
Average 
(1997 to 2019) 
7.4 1.9 3.0 1.2 1.3 5.1 1.8 -0.5 1.9 1.9 
2020 3.4 0.8 1.1 2.0 2.0 4.4 1.2 0.3 2.9 1.4 
2021 3.3 2.5 1.7 1.9 0.3 3.0 0.9 0.3 -0.1 2.2 








Appendix 3: Simulation results 




































 Brazil India 
2020 89.5 9.5 -5.8 3.4 101.2 72.3 12.1 -10.3 4.4 88.9 
2021 101.2 7.3 2.8 3.3 102.7 88.9 10.1 8.8 3.0 89.8 
2022 102.7 7.7 0.3 6.3 104.1 89.8 7.3 6.6 4.3 88.5 
2030 112.0 7.7 0.3 6.3 112.9 81.9 7.3 6.6 4.3 81.3 
2040 118.6 7.7 0.3 6.3 119.1 78.0 7.3 6.6 4.3 77.7 
2050 122.2 7.7 0.3 6.3 122.4 76.5 7.3 6.6 4.3 76.4 
 Canada Italy 
2020 88.6 20.0 -7.1 0.8 114.6 134.8 12.8 -10.6 1.2 161.5 
2021 114.6 8.7 5.2 2.5 115.1 161.5 5.9 5.2 0.9 158.1 
2022 115.1 3.7 1.9 1.4 115.1 158.1 3.3 0.0 1.0 159.8 
2030 115.1 3.7 1.9 1.4 115.1 170.9 3.3 0.0 1.0 172.4 
2040 115.1 3.7 1.9 1.4 115.1 185.5 3.3 0.0 1.0 186.9 
2050 115.1 3.7 1.9 1.4 115.1 198.7 3.3 0.0 1.0 199.9 
 People’s Republic of China Japan 
2020 52.6 10.6 1.9 1.1 61.7 238.0 15.8 -5.3 0.3 266.1 
2021 61.7 10.5 8.2 1.7 66.7 266.1 4.6 2.3 0.3 263.9 
2022 66.7 5.9 7.1 2.2 66.9 263.9 5.5 1.1 0.4 265.5 
2030 68.1 5.9 7.1 2.2 68.2 275.6 5.5 1.1 0.4 277.0 
2040 68.9 5.9 7.1 2.2 69.0 288.4 5.5 1.1 0.4 289.6 
2050 69.3 5.9 7.1 2.2 69.3 299.4 5.5 1.1 0.4 300.4 
 Germany UK 
2020 59.5 11.2 -6.0 2.0 73.2 85.4 16.1 -9.8 2.9 107.7 
2021 73.2 3.2 4.2 1.9 72.2 107.7 9.5 5.9 -0.1 111.2 
2022 72.2 -0.3 1.4 1.7 69.7 111.2 3.7 1.9 1.8 111.0 
2030 54.2 -0.3 1.4 1.7 52.2 109.6 3.7 1.9 1.8 109.4 
2040 37.0 -0.3 1.4 1.7 35.6 108.1 3.7 1.9 1.8 107.9 
2050 24.4 -0.3 1.4 1.7 23.3 107.0 3.7 1.9 1.8 106.9 
 France USA 
2020 98.1 12.1 -9.8 2.0 118.5 108.7 19.2 -4.3 1.4 131.1 
2021 118.5 6.9 6.0 0.3 118.4 131.1 9.1 3.1 2.2 133.7 
2022 118.4 3.2 1.2 0.9 119.2 133.7 5.2 2.4 1.7 133.7 
2030 124.5 3.2 1.2 0.9 125.2 133.8 5.2 2.4 1.7 133.8 
2040 131.0 3.2 1.2 0.9 131.5 133.9 5.2 2.4 1.7 133.9 
2050 136.2 3.2 1.2 0.9 136.7 133.9 5.2 2.4 1.7 133.9 
Source (basic data): IMF 
 




































 Brazil India 
2020 89.5 9.5 -5.8 3.4 101.2 72.3 12.1 -10.3 4.4 88.9 
2021 101.2 7.3 2.8 3.3 102.7 88.9 10.1 8.8 3.0 89.8 
2022 102.7 6.0 0.3 6.3 102.4 89.8 6.0 6.6 4.3 87.1 
2030 100.8 6.0 0.3 6.3 100.6 74.2 6.0 6.6 4.3 73.0 
2040 99.5 6.0 0.3 6.3 99.4 66.3 6.0 6.6 4.3 65.9 
2050 98.8 6.0 0.3 6.3 98.7 63.5 6.0 6.6 4.3 63.3 
 Canada Italy 
2020 88.6 20.0 -7.1 0.8 114.6 134.8 12.8 -10.6 1.2 161.5 






2022 115.1 3.0 1.9 1.4 114.4 158.1 3.0 0.0 1.0 159.5 
2030 110.2 3.0 1.9 1.4 109.7 168.8 3.0 0.0 1.0 170.1 
2040 105.7 3.0 1.9 1.4 105.4 181.1 3.0 0.0 1.0 182.2 
2050 102.5 3.0 1.9 1.4 102.2 192.1 3.0 0.0 1.0 193.2 
 People’s Republic of China Japan 
2020 52.6 10.6 1.9 1.1 61.7 238.0 15.8 -5.3 0.3 266.1 
2021 61.7 10.5 8.2 1.7 66.7 266.1 4.6 2.3 0.3 263.9 
2022 66.7 6.0 7.1 2.2 67.1 263.9 3.0 1.1 0.4 263.0 
2030 69.0 6.0 7.1 2.2 69.2 256.9 3.0 1.1 0.4 256.1 
2040 70.3 6.0 7.1 2.2 70.4 249.3 3.0 1.1 0.4 248.6 
2050 70.9 6.0 7.1 2.2 70.9 242.8 3.0 1.1 0.4 242.2 
 Germany UK 
2020 59.5 11.2 -6.0 2.0 73.2 85.4 16.1 -9.8 2.9 107.7 
2021 73.2 3.2 4.2 1.9 72.2 107.7 9.5 5.9 -0.1 111.2 
2022 72.2 3.0 1.4 1.7 73.0 111.2 3.0 1.9 1.8 110.3 
2030 78.1 3.0 1.4 1.7 78.7 104.8 3.0 1.9 1.8 104.1 
2040 83.7 3.0 1.4 1.7 84.2 98.9 3.0 1.9 1.8 98.4 
2050 87.8 3.0 1.4 1.7 88.2 94.8 3.0 1.9 1.8 94.5 
 France USA 
2020 98.1 12.1 -9.8 2.0 118.5 108.7 19.2 -4.3 1.4 131.1 
2021 118.5 6.9 6.0 0.3 118.4 131.1 9.1 3.1 2.2 133.7 
2022 118.4 3.0 1.2 0.9 119.0 133.7 3.0 2.4 1.7 131.5 
2030 122.9 3.0 1.2 0.9 123.4 118.2 3.0 2.4 1.7 116.6 
2040 127.6 3.0 1.2 0.9 128.0 104.7 3.0 2.4 1.7 103.6 
2050 131.4 3.0 1.2 0.9 131.7 95.6 3.0 2.4 1.7 94.9 
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